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When I was invited to give a paper on the legal aspects of iatrogenic disorders, I started thinking about the application to them of the law of negligence and I could see no particular difficulty. All medical practitioners must use reasonable care when going about their work. The law does not expect them to warrant success. If a patient suffers damage as a result of a course of treatment or the prescribing of a drug, the doctor is not liable for negligence as long as he has used reasonable care. He will be deemed to have used reasonable care if he has followed what is regarded by responsible and sensible members of the profession as sound practice. From time to time he will have to make a decision, often requiring him to balance one risk against another. This is what led Mr Jordan, the obstetrician, into litigation which was decided by both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in his favour. He had to assess the risks to a child of continuing trial by forceps against the risks attendant on a caesarian section. Both courts adjudged that he had used reasonable care, although with hindsight it was arguable that a caesarian section should have been done sooner than it was. The House of Lords adjusted that there were not special rules either limiting or extending the law of negligence in relation to medical practitioners.
I have now, however, learned more about the kinds of circumstances in which iatrogenic disorders occur: the problems which psychiatrists have when prescribing drugs for mental disorders; the possibility of damage to eyes and sight from some kinds of ophthalmic treatment; the fine assessments which have to be made when using ECT; and, for a layman the most frightening and surprising of all, the disasters which can occur when X-rays are used with tracing fluids to discover damaged nerves. I now appreciate that for most practitioners the important legal problem is not negligence but the obtaining of consent to treatment -including, of course, treatment with drugs. Most practitioners do use reasonable care, so they have nothing to fear from the law; but all practitioners have to obtain the consent of their patients to treatment.
What is consent in law? A person consents to treatment if he knows what is going to be done to him and what are reasonably likely to be the consequences and risks of what is proposed to be done. In formulating that definition I speak as a lawyer, but I like to think that I have some knowledge of the practice of medicine both as a patient and as a former barrister who was much concerned with medical negligence cases. From such experience as I have had, I doubt whether many doctors, unless asked, give their patients more than the barest details of any treatment they advise and rarely any warning of the risks. It has, however, been my experience that the doctors who have attended me and my family have given warnings about the possible side effects of any drugs they have prescribed, but usually in the form of describing likely symptoms rather than risks. I suspect that some doctors say nothing about risks because they are confident that if they did their patients would not accept the treatment which they are sure is required. The law would not accept this as a good reason for not telling the patient what the risks were if he suffered from one of them, It seems to me likely that in most cases the patient is not told of the risks because to do so would either cause him needless anxiety or would be beyond his comprehension. Take by way of example a controversial kind of case, There has been much publicized criticism of the use of ECT in mental hospitals. One head of complaint is that patients are not told of the risks to which they will be exposed. If EeT is decided upon because a patient is pathologically depressed, it seems to me as a layman that telling him about the risks which he will run would be likely to increase his depression and increase his difficulties in making a decision. Problems of the same kind are likely to ensue too when a patient is neurotic. Further, it is a matter of common knowledge that hope has great healing powers. What should a patient be told when the only hope of saving life is to use a form of treatment which is known to have only a small chance of success? This problem arises in the use of chemotherapy for the treatment of cancer. In some forms of cancer, the success rate, so I understand, is encouraging; in others, for example cancers of the ovaries and lungs, it is poor. Should the woman who has a massive inoperable ovarian cancer, which will kill her in about six months, be told that the proposed course of chemotherapy, with all its unpleasant and distressing side effects, has only a remote chance of success? Or should she be left with hope that she may recover? There can be no lawyer's glib answers to these kinds of clinical problems.
What the lawyer can do is to advise that a medical practitioner need only tell his patient about risks which are reasonably likely to occur; but such advice is not likely to be of much practical value because, of course, the practitioner will want to know wlJ.at the lawyer cannot tell him, namely what risks are reasonably likely to occur. If he asks this question he will get a piece of legal jargon in reply, viz., that the answer will depend upon the evidence given at a trial and will be an issue of fact.
Fortunately for the medical profession, so far there have been very few cases based upon an allegation that a medical practitioner failed to warn his patient of a risk which in fact caused damage. I can only remember reading about one such case, which was based upon an allegation that a professional singer had not been warned about the likelihood of a throat operation affecting her singing voice. I cannot remember whether the claim succeeded or not. It would be unwise, however, for the medical profession to assume that in the future there will be few claims. Public attitudes towards making claims against the medical profession have changed. About thirty years ago I had great difficulty in persuading the parents of a young child who had been permanently crippled as a result of a clear case of medical negligence that it was their duty to their child to make a claim. The child's maternal grandfather had told the parents that it would be shameful to sue a surgeon who had done his best for the child, however incompetent he may have been. I doubt whether any barrister these days would have the same experience. Further, the disasters which have occurred in the last decade through the use of a few drugs have alerted the public to dangers which may exist.
I have long been of the opinion that the lawyer whose advice consists merely of the exposition of legal principles, ill serves those who have to apply those principles. I would not justify my presence here if I did not try to make my advice applicable to the kind of problems with which medical practitioners have to deal.
It is important for all to remember, not least judges and lawyers, that the law should be applied with common sense. Nothing makes the law more asinine than stretching it to its logical conclusions. It follows, so it seems to me -and I am giving a personal opinion -that judges should be ready to recognize that the circumstances and condition of a particular patient may make the giving of information about the risks of a proposed treatment useless, unwise and possibly harmful. The intelligence and mental state of the patient are in practice taken into account, and the law should approve of this being done. The degree of the risk is another factor to be weighed. The probability of nausea being caused through taking a drug is not to be compared with that of blindness being caused by the use of an eye drop, Failure to mention the nausea will probably not vitiate consent, but failure to mention blindness probably would.
The most difficult aspect of this problem of consent is for the practitioner to decide what risks are reasonably likely to occur. There is, as you all know, a chance that a patient under anaesthesia may suffer cardiac arrest even though all proper precautions have been taken to test fitness for it. Nevertheless, the chances of this happening are so remote that there is no need to warn the patient that cardiac arrest may occur. A recital to the patient of all the possible hazards of treatment is unnecessary in law and, I assume, most undesirable in medicine. There must be a real risk of unpleasant and serious consequences arising. If one patient in ten is likely to suffer, then there is such a risk -probably even when there is one patient in a hundred; but after that the likelihood diminishes, getting further and further away from the real and nearer the possible; and the law is not concerned with possibilities. By the time that the possibility has reached less than one in a thousand, most level-headed people would disregard it. That proposition can, I think, be tested against human experience. I have, been told by an experienced obstetrician that approximately three children in every thousand are born with serious congenital defects. Women know that there is a possibility of this kind, but its existence neither inhibits procreation nor seems to cause anxiety for most women during pregnancy.
Personal opinions such as I have put forward are not a sound basis for the law. In a recent report the Criminal Law Revision Committee, when making recommendations to the Home Secretary about the law of assault (which concerns doctors because of the need for consent to treatment), suggested that a broadly-based committee should consider what is required in the interests of both the public and patients. Legalism must not be allowed to inhibit sound and sensible medical practice.
